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# International Atomic Energy Agency

Aarna Pai & Srihaas Sudhireddy  
*Chairs*



# IAEA

## Letter from the Chair

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 14th iteration of MMSMUN! Your chairs for the IAEA committee are Srihaas Sudhireddy and Aarna Pai, and both of them are thrilled to meet and guide all of you through the conference. Srihaas Sudhireddy is a 7th grader at George H. Moody Middle School and has been participating in Model UN since 6th grade, winning awards and attending various conferences. In his free time, you can find him playing chess, solving challenging math problems, and spending time with his friends and family. Aarna Pai is an 8th grader at George H. Moody Middle School and has been active in Model UN since 6th grade, with her first conference being MMSMUN itself. Outside of MUN, Aarna swims with the NOVA swim team and enjoys baking, reading, and piano.

We highly recommend that you do extensive research to get a strong understanding of the committee. The committee will take place in April 2026, with its operations being global or focused on a specific region. When drafting resolutions and directives, you should consider affected areas. The International Atomic Energy Agency is an intergovernmental organization that regulates the use of nuclear energy. With the rise of nuclear weapons in warfare, strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is necessary. Furthermore, the weaponization of nuclear-powered plants in armed conflict is becoming increasingly prevalent, bringing the risk of deadly radiation, destabilization, and the endangerment of civilians. As a delegate, it is in your hands to uphold the principles of humanity, overcome obstacles, and work together to form solutions to the conflicts presented to you.

As a reminder to all, you are required to dress appropriately for the conference. Our dress code follows Western business attire (ties, suits, blazers, formal dresses, and skirts). We do have exceptions to religious attire if desired. While they are not required, position papers are **highly** recommended, as they are **required** if you want to be considered for awards. Any usage of AI will result in the **immediate disqualification** for awards and a **ban** from the conference. Upon completion, please send your position paper to [hcps-sudhiresr@henricostudents.org](mailto:hcps-sudhiresr@henricostudents.org) **and** [hcps-paiaa@henricostudents.org](mailto:hcps-paiaa@henricostudents.org) by 5:00 PM of April 10th with editing access. Any violation of the given rules will result in disqualification or point deduction, so keep that in mind when preparing for the conference.

When deciding awards, we will evaluate the quality of debate, the effectiveness of resolutions and directives, the delegate's level of collaboration, and the standard of their position paper. Keep in mind that awards are final and will not be negotiated.

Your Chairs,  
Srihaas Sudhireddy & Aarna Pai

# MMSMUN XIV

George H. Moody Middle School Model United Nations

## IAEA

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***Topic 1: Strengthening the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime***  
***Topic 2: Addressing the Weaponization of Nuclear Power Plants in Armed Conflicts***

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### Committee Overview

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a crucial committee, operating as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization in the United Nations family, that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. IAEA is widely known as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. Established in 1957 as the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field, the Agency collaborates with its Member States and numerous partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. It

comprises 167 Member States (as of November 2015).

The IAEA exists to pursue the "safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear sciences and technology" (Pillars 2005). The IAEA fulfills this mission through three primary functions: inspecting existing nuclear facilities to ensure their peaceful use, providing information and developing standards to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and serving as a hub for various scientific fields involved in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The IAEA has established programs to help developing countries plan systematically for building the capability to manage a nuclear

power program. These efforts include the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Group, which has carried out Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review missions in Indonesia, Jordan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The IAEA reports that roughly 60 countries are considering how to include nuclear power in their energy plans.

The international nuclear nonproliferation regime exists to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs have exploited weaknesses in the regime that must be fixed if it is to serve its purpose. Those weaknesses stem from both structural ambiguities in the current rules and a failure to enforce them. Customary international humanitarian law instructs states to take “particular care” of nuclear electrical generating stations to avoid “release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.” It does not outrightly prohibit such attacks.

More recently, the IAEA identified the Seven Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security to ensure that functional equipment, independent staffing, reliable power, secure logistics, monitoring systems, and clear communication with regulators are maintained. Useful though such guidance is, its implementation amidst a messy war situation cannot be guaranteed. States can only be encouraged to follow codes of responsible conduct to ensure that nuclear facilities are treated with the sensitivity they deserve, since disasters at such sites could be unforgiving such as the Chernobyl Disaster.

IAEA plays a significant role in the nuclear energy industry, focusing on developing nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, promoting the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing

radiation. IAEA's core goals are to verify that safeguarded nuclear material and activities are not used for military purposes, help countries to upgrade nuclear safety and security, prepare and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies, and help countries mobilize peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

### **Topic 1: Strengthening the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime**

#### **Background**

With the rise of global warming and security concerns, countries are showing renewed interest in nuclear energy. At the same time, there is growing concern over the security risks that the possession of nuclear energy could present. Several government organizations and the IAEA have formally recognized the issue of security risks with the Russia-Ukraine war bringing light to the issue. With access to nuclear energy, governments could develop highly destructive technology, like nuclear

weapons. These governments gain nuclear power from regulatory bodies like the IAEA if they permit their usage. This concern is not unfounded. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a cornerstone treaty for global nuclear nonproliferation., which is governed by the 191 countries of the IAEA who focus on maintaining the regime's effectiveness. This treaty aims to maintain peace and solve security concerns through complex safeguards.

The NPT was introduced for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Under this treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states agreed not to develop or obtain nuclear arms. Nuclear-weapon states must not assist, induce, or encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states are defined as those that developed and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. There are five

nuclear-weapon States parties under the Treaty.

Since the 1990s, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has faced several challenges to its integrity and authority. Most notably, North Korea's non-compliance with its Safeguards agreement and its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, as well as Iran's non-compliance with its Safeguards agreement and its suspected nuclear weapons development (while under the treaty). Additional countries later ratified the treaty; as of 2007, only three countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) had refused to sign it. Under this fragile treaty, there is growing concern that more and more countries will have access to sensitive nuclear technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.

On 11 February 2004, US President George W. Bush proposed a solution to a specific loophole the NPT presented. This loophole specifies that countries are allowed

to develop nuclear technology as long as it is for "peaceful purposes." In essence, this means countries can produce nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, as long as they claim it is for civilian energy. However, the same technology used for civilian energy can also be repurposed for nuclear weaponry. He directly stated "so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing", further proposing that the "Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG] should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants." After putting forward this seven-point solution to the National Defense University, it eventually did not become a binding agreement due to controversy about its ambitious characteristics.

Another critical issue of the NPT is its discriminatory nature. The five recognized

nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) are allowed to keep their arms and develop new ones, while the rest of the non-nuclear-weapon states are not allowed to develop such weapons.

Non-nuclear-weapon states argue that the treaty is unfair in this way and seek modifications to promote a more balanced approach to nuclear disarmament.

The success of the NPT heavily relies on verification systems and collaboration among nations. The IAEA plays an important role in this, conducting inspections and monitoring nuclear facilities to confirm that states are following treaty rules. However, due to the IAEA's limited authority and resources, this treaty depends on transparency and collaboration from member states, as well as adequate funding.

Nevertheless, the NPT is one of the most widely adhered to treaties regarding nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear

disarmament, with 191 states parties signed under it. The reason most countries are open to accepting it is that most non-nuclear states neither had the capacity nor the desire to develop nuclear arms/weapons, and were extremely vigilant of the destructive nature of this path. In 1968, it was established that, for their special status, nuclear states would help non-nuclear states in the development of civilian nuclear power (though the distinction of nuclear energy used for civilians and nuclear energy used for weapons is not so clear), and nuclear states would comply with measures of disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has provided a robust foundation for curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and international cooperation regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Though the treaty has faced many criticisms and challenges, the NPT's relevance and effectiveness heavily rely on the cooperation of member states to address

these issues and work towards a more secure future.

### **Current Status**

The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime framework operates under a common ground for both Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), with three distinct pillars and supplementary components. For the 1st pillar of non-proliferation, NNWS agree to never acquire nuclear weapons, while NWS agree not to transfer them. The 2nd pillar rules that NWS need to commit to negotiations regarding nuclear disarmament. Lastly, the 3rd pillar of peaceful uses declares that ALL states have the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

Recently, debate regarding the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime has remained focused on the three pillars, but continues to expand into other sectors such as emerging technologies and regional tensions. Security concerns in response to

terrorism have been heavily discussed with the growing use of cyberattacks on computer systems that manage nuclear power plants.

The IAEA has been tasked with integrating ETs into safeguards to more efficiently monitor nuclear facilities to counter corruption and unintended action. Another major advocacy involving ETs includes risk mitigation in NC3.

To counter terrorism and to improve nuclear security, the regime focuses on preventing non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials or sabotaging facilities. The International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Material aims to establish regulations to safely ship sensitive material. Both these pillars interconnect to facilitate existing operations. Overall, these 3 pillars interconnect to facilitate nuclear operations by restricting nuclear operations, ensure control, and keep nuclear energy for productive, positive use. The issues of the

nuclear regime remain a severe topic for the IAEA. Currently, the expiration of the New START, aka the collapse of bilateral arms control, has arrived. Without a successor, nuclear buildup constrains disarmament and its credibility for the IAEA. To go further, there remains a violation of the NPT Article VI by the three-way arms race and modernization run by China, the USA, and Russia.

Following the same theme, the nuclear regime faces a crisis of enforcement where UN Security Council members have hampered action. The de facto global nuclear moratorium has been eroded with controlled debate from NWS, arguing that nuclear testing should be reformed and permitted. Another treaty called the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Test Treaty is under threat as the resumption of nuclear testing could trigger a cycle of debate and calls for new frameworks.

### **Analysis and Solutions**

Overall, the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime must be addressed, amended, and collaborated on by all countries attending the committee. The regime has a variety of holes from external actions, such as non-compliance and rogue actors, to internal issues, such as the expiration of the New START contract and the lack of enforcement clauses. The imbalance between NWS and NNWS regarding the non-proliferation regime remains a crucial issue, directly affecting the flow of the committee. To go deeper, the framework of the regime itself stands strong but has been heavily eroded, needing change. The advocations of the regime must be followed and will help with the direction of your solutions.

Elaborating on solutions, delegates must issue public directives that directly address an issue regarding the regime during this topic, while staying true to their position's policies. We will be looking at the

quality of public directives/solutions when you present, but whether you pass or not can also be a small factor, since we will also be looking at realism in the committee. We would highly recommend that you form blocs that the IAEA use aka pre-made blocs. For example, a major example would be the NNWS bloc. This bloc could work together to form resolutions that improve their situation specifically. We would also like to see strategies with private directives or joint-private directives to manipulate the committee. For example, NNWS could cause a crisis that forces a resolution to favor them and make regulations that improve their situation. In conclusion, the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime is crucial to addressing nuclear usage and its impacts, but it lacks in many areas, challenging delegates to innovate effective and feasible solutions using collaboration, backroom manipulation, and advocacy.

### **Questions to Consider**

1. What is the role of nuclear deterrence?
2. What is the vision for nuclear disarmament and arms reduction?
3. What steps are necessary to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons?
4. How can the international community address the perceived inequalities within the treaty?
5. How can the international community better balance the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy (Article IV) with the risks of spreading enrichment and reprocessing technologies?

### **Topic 2: Addressing the Weaponization of Nuclear Power-Plants in Armed Conflict**

#### **Background**

In modern armed conflicts, violence has increasingly extended beyond conventional military targets, putting civilian infrastructure at grave risk. Among

the most vulnerable are nuclear power plants, where military action can turn energy facilities into tools of coercion with the potential for mass destruction. The deliberate targeting or weaponization of these plants introduces unprecedented threats to civilian populations, the environment, and global security, revealing significant gaps in current legal protections and safety frameworks. Civilian infrastructure can be reinforced with the improvement of militia in nuclear facilities and strong safeguards that can prevent accidents.

During a war, nuclear facilities could be damaged and lead to accidents. For example, a plane can crash into a facility. Although these accidents are unlikely, modern power plants are built with robust safety features, such as pressurized steel vessels containing the structure, which is itself housed in a massive pre-stressed concrete structure. While these modern

reactors are technically very sturdy, the consequences of an accident remain severe.

The radioactive fallout and subsequent environmental and agricultural impacts from a nuclear accident could affect populations across continents, not just forces in the origin country.

Amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian forces have shelled and seized the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine, the largest such plant in Europe. This creates a military and security risk around this nuclear facility. This is because, following the Russian occupation of this plant, communication with plant staff is now difficult or blocked due to the deactivation of some mobile networks and because Russian forces blocked the internet, undermining operational safety. The situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a reminder of the expansive nature of nuclear risks; it also shows that deliberately targeting nuclear reactors would

present new types of risks. The IAEA considers that this situation is contrary to one of the seven pillars of nuclear safety.

World leaders have expressed concerns, and the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting to discuss the issue. The IAEA's Board of Governors passed a resolution that deplored the Russian invasion and urged Russia to allow Ukraine to continue to control its nuclear facilities. However, no specific treaty exists to deal with this threat, although Protocol I and II of the Geneva Convention allow for "norms" of behavior in wartime that should be respected.

The legal framework of the protection of nuclear power plants may seem comprehensive, as it includes multiple international treaties and conventions designed to limit harm during armed conflict and prevent nuclear-related threats. Instruments such as Article 56 and 15 of the first amendment protocol to the 1949

Geneva Conventions aim to serve as safeguards for nuclear facilities. While the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) focus on safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities. However, none of these legal initiatives effectively governs attacks on nuclear facilities, nor do they exhaustively impinge on states' ability to justify such attacks during interstate conflict. Their language is often ambiguous, and primarily focused on peacetime security and terrorism, not active warfare.

Though the first and second amendment protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit kinetic attacks on nuclear facilities, amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian military attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine raise questions about the normalization of kinetic

military operations carried out by states against nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, the practice of targeting nuclear facilities as a tool of statecraft has been gradually normalized.

Attacks similar to this have occurred since the earliest days of the nuclear era. In 1943, Allied forces undertook this kind of attack for the first time, targeting the Norsk Hydro hydrogen-electrolysis plant. From 1980 to 1988, Iran, Iraq, and Israel conducted several attacks on nuclear facilities. In 1991 and 1993, in the course of the Gulf War and the period immediately following it, the United States carried out attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities. In September 2007, Israel attacked a suspected nuclear facility in Al-Kibar, Syria. To prevent other countries from similarly targeting and attacking nuclear facilities in future conflicts, the international community must improve existing guidelines for their physical protection. The current

international nuclear safeguarding regime focuses on protections against those who might attempt the unauthorized removal of nuclear materials or engage in sabotage actions. However, past incidents show the limits of this approach when nuclear facilities are in a war zone.

### **Current Status**

In the 21st century, nuclear armed conflict has increasingly progressed to the point of harming civilian infrastructure heavily. Nuclear power plants were historically built to maintain peace, but due to corruption and timid regulation, they are now seen as weapons of warfare. Recent conflicts, such as the Ukraine-Russia war, have shown that nuclear facilities are no longer treated as civilian objects, but as a trigger of fear and sign of power. Weaponization is now abused to occupy militaries, intimidation, and strategic leverage and trade. The risk of weaponization is no longer hypothetical, but

as a global, immediate concern that threatens the safety and security of organizations, residents, and the world itself. To go further, environmental, humanitarian, and cross-border consequences occur due to the effects of any radiological incident.

Overall, this elevates the issue of weaponization from a national concern to a priority and responsibility of the IAEA.

As previously mentioned, the conflict in Ukraine represents the most disastrous nuclear crisis since the scarring incident of Fukushima. Nuclear facilities, including Zaporizhzhia, have faced military presence, power outages, and other unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, the loss of off-site power has made relying on diesel generators so prone to the point where accidents occur on a daily basis. Armed personnel are stationed at nuclear facilities, which raises the question of whether civilians use facilities or the military themselves. The staff of these same facilities

face extreme stress and limited rotation.

These situations demonstrate how nuclear plants pose undermining issues and the abuse of countries that use facilities as shields during warfare.

Armed conflict undermines the core principles of nuclear safety. Moreover, nuclear power plants need uninterrupted electricity for energy pools and cooling reactors in a mass amount, demanding requirements that could be allocated for another act. Backup systems are heavily damaged in the process of nuclear facilities compromising safety. Additionally, communication breakdowns limit coordination with international organizations such as the IAEA itself. Moreover, explosives and shelling can disrupt safety infrastructure even if the nuclear power plant is not targeted for that very cause. These conditions raise concerns about nuclear radiation and its cross-border effects.

For a quick definition, international humanitarian law classifies nuclear power plants for civilian objects that need special protection. Civilian infrastructure and military strategy has become unclear due to armed conflict. Notably, using nuclear plants as shields violates the principles of distinction. Furthermore, weak enforcement makes it difficult to hold violators accountable. Existing treaties were not designed for military occupation in nuclear facilities. Dangerous legal precedents are being risked due to state behavior in recent armed nuclear conflict. Overall, continued violations may undermine international humanitarian law.

Radiation release from plants can cause long-term environmental consequences, especially regarding topics like biology. International crises are often born from local conflicts, with the latter being nuclear armed conflict reaching neighboring countries. To go further, the fear

of nuclear accidents can cause civilians to be displaced and cause chaos that can potentially interfere with organized actions. International organizations face limited outreach in safety zones, and humanitarian responses have been more complex due to contamination in nuclear power plants. To go further, the weaponization of nuclear plants threatens global nuclear energy and undermines its use. In conclusion, these highlights stress that the weaponization of nuclear weapons undermines the international safeguards that you delegates discuss today.

### **Analysis and Solutions**

One of the most effective ways to minimise the risks would be to create a demilitarised zone around nuclear power plants to protect the population. At an elevated level of analysis, the two main principles relating to the making of war are discrimination and proportionality. Attacks on nuclear and associated facilities violate

both principles if the facilities are civil and not legitimate military targets, and if the attacks do not discriminate between military and civilian objectives. In 1956, the International Red Cross proposed an immunity from attack for installations, including “nuclear power stations,” where the attack might endanger civilian populations. The IRC push on this issue eventually led to Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

Article 56 of Protocol I states that works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack if such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Protocol II of the Geneva Convention also relates to attacks on nuclear and associated facilities. Article 15 states that works or installations containing dangerous forces shall not be made the

object of attack if such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Beyond the protocols, Rule 42 of International Humanitarian Law applies to attacks on nuclear and associated facilities, requiring particular care to avoid the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long recognized the need to prohibit armed attacks on all nuclear facilities. In 1987, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution regarding the Protection of Nuclear Installations against Armed Attacks. In summary, Protocols I and II of the Geneva Convention and the Rules of Humanitarian Law prohibit attacks on nuclear and associated facilities and have created norms of international behavior. Treaties and international norms provide little or no ability to enforce their

terms against parties in violation, particularly major states. Therefore, potential consequences of attacks on nuclear facilities must be considered to minimize effects on the environment and the population.

**Questions to Consider**

1. What directives or measures can be enforced to reduce risks to nuclear facilities during evolving conflicts?

2. How have nuclear powers been used, occupied, and deployed in your country and their recent armed conflicts(if they had them)?
3. How does nuclear warfare affect civilian infrastructure?
4. What type of actions or resolutions undermine or strengthen your country?

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